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INTRODUCTION
Though primary care is essential to 
equitable, high-quality, and cost-effective 
health services,1 its sustainability is 
increasingly challenged by both the number 
of GPs leaving the profession and problems 
in recruitment.2,3 Two-thirds of GPs report 
unmanageable workloads,4 and almost half 
report emotional exhaustion associated 
with their work.5 These pressures have 
been variously attributed to substantial 
increases in consultation rates, the 
complexity of patients’ needs, and growing 
policy expectations to move more care from 
hospitals to the community.4,6,7 Efforts to 
address the workforce crisis, including 
enhanced recruitment and retention 
strategies and diversification of skill-mix 
in general practice, have been welcomed.8 
However, there has been noticeably less 
focus on the work environments of GPs,3,7 
even though the conditions in which 
people work, including the extent to which 
operational processes are supportive of 
the goals of work, are known to be highly 
consequential for worker satisfaction.9,10
Research in hospitals has clearly 
identified the impact of suboptimal 
work conditions on staff efficiency and 
morale. Operational failures — defined as 
disruptions, errors, or inadequacies in the 
information, supplies, or equipment needed 
for patient care11 — occur frequently in 
secondary care settings. These failures 
frustrate employees, decrease individual 
and organisational performance, and 
increase risks to patients.11–13 Often, they 
may appear initially as small problems (for 
example, thermometer probe covers going 
missing or incorrect medications delivered 
to wards), but cumulatively can be highly 
impactful because they push healthcare 
professionals to use workarounds or time-
consuming adjustments to get tasks done.12 
Hospital-based research shows that 9% of 
a healthcare professional’s working day can 
be spent dealing with operational failures,11 
but once recognised they are tractable to 
improvement through systems redesign 
with attendant benefits in organisational 
efficiency and job satisfaction.14 
The authors recently reviewed the 
international medical literature on 
operational failures in primary care,15 
and found that it has remained an under-
researched area. In this study, qualitative 
methods were used to identify the 
operational failures reported in everyday 
practice by NHS GPs, and how they 




A qualitative interview study was conducted 
with GPs. ‘Operational failures’ were used 
as a sensitising concept16 to facilitate 
exploration of problems in primary care 
work systems. Primary care work systems 
were defined as anyone or anything the 




Operational failures, defined as inadequacies 
or errors in the information, supplies, or 
equipment needed for patient care, are 
known to be highly consequential in hospital 
environments. Despite their likely relevance for 
GPs’ experiences of work, they remain under-
explored in primary care.
Aim
To identify operational failures in the primary 
care work environment and to examine how 
they influence GPs’ work.
Design and setting
Qualitative interview study in the East of England. 
Method
Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with GPs (n = 21). Data analysis was based on 
the constant comparison method.
Results
GPs reported a large burden of operational 
failures, many of them related to information 
transfer with external healthcare providers, 
practice technology, and organisation of work 
within practices. Faced with operational failures, 
GPs undertook ‘compensatory labour’ to fulfil 
their duties of coordinating and safeguarding 
patients’ care. Dealing with operational failures 
imposed significant additional strain in the 
context of already stretched daily schedules, 
but this work remained largely invisible. In part, 
this was because GPs acted to fix problems in 
the here-and-now rather than referring them 
to source, and they characteristically did not 
report operational failures at system level. They 
also identified challenges in making process 
improvements at practice level, including 
medicolegal uncertainties about delegation.
Conclusion
Operational failures in primary care matter 
for GPs and their experience of work. 
Compensatory labour is burdensome with an 
unintended consequence of rendering these 
failures largely invisible. Recognition of the 
significance of operational failures should 
stimulate efforts to make the primary care 
work environment more attractive.
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Sampling
GPs were invited to participate via a regional 
Clinical Research Network,18 using criteria 
relating to:
• length of time qualified (≥/<10 years);
• location (rural/urban); and
• practice size (≤5 GPs/>5 GPs).
The sample size was not defined in 
advance but the authors continued to 
interview GPs until they were confident that 
data saturation had been reached, which 
was determined when additional data no 
longer added to the advancement of the 
analysis.16
Data collection
Interviews were conducted by an academic 
GP and a health services researcher, 
both experienced qualitative researchers. 
Interviews took place in participants’ 
practices or by telephone between February 
and July 2018. The interview topic guide was 
informed by a recent critical interpretive 
synthesis on operational failures in primary 
care15 (see Supplementary Box S1 for 
details). As well as general questions, GPs 
were asked to describe operational failures 
they had experienced in their most recent 
clinical session, using their own schedules 
and patient notes as an aide-memoire, 
a technique known as chart-stimulated 
recall.19 The topic guide was modified 
iteratively to pursue emergent themes.
Analysis
All interviews were audio-recorded, 
transcribed in full, and anonymised. Analysis 
was based on the constant comparative 
method.16 All interviews were read and 
coded independently by the interviewers. 
Initially, types of operational failure were 
open coded, as were the conditions, 
consequences, and actions associated 
with these failures. In the second stage of 
coding, related codes were drawn together 
and the data synthesised using sensitising 
constructs from systems engineering20 
and Hollnagel’s Safety-II concepts21 (see 
Supplementary Box S2 for details). Field 
notes and memos were discussed during 
team meetings to facilitate theoretical 
development. Quotations were selected by 
consensus to most closely reflect typical 
responses and diversity within codes. NVivo 
(version 12) was used to facilitate data 
management. Assurances of confidentiality 
and anonymity of interview data were 
provided to participants, and written 
informed consent was obtained to digitally 
record the interviews. 
RESULTS
Twenty-three GPs working in 16 practices 
responded positively to the invitation 
to participate and, of these, 21 were 
interviewed. Eleven worked in urban 
practices, 14 had been practising as GPs 
for ≥10 years, and 14 worked in practices 
of ≥5 GPs. Median interview duration was 
29 minutes (range = 12–48 minutes). It was 
found that GPs reported multiple operational 
failures that were hugely burdensome, and 
required what was termed ‘compensatory 
labour’ to address them.
Operational failures encountered during 
GPs’ work
GPs reported a significant burden of 
operational failures. The most common 
failures related to problems in the supply of 
information to them from sources outside of 
their own practice. Delayed or missing hospital 
discharge letters were frequent, but excessive 
information from hospitals was reported to be 
as much of a problem as too little information. 
For instance, GPs described important 
information being lost in 12-page discharge 
summaries where they ‘couldn’t work out 
the wood from the trees’ (GP18). Hospital 
letters often included recommendations for 
specific investigations or medications for 
patients but left it to GPs to clarify who was 
responsible for implementing them. Efforts 
to get necessary information from hospitals 
were further frustrated by hospital protocols 
stating that certain information (for example, 
How this fits in 
Operational failures, defined as 
inadequacies or errors in the information, 
supplies, or equipment needed for patient 
care, are known to be highly consequential 
in hospital environments. This qualitative 
study shows that operational failures 
are also common and burdensome in 
UK primary care. Examples included 
problems in the supply of information to 
GPs from external healthcare providers, 
technology problems, and missing or 
broken equipment. These problems 
required what was termed ‘compensatory 
labour’ to address them. Although GPs’ 
compensatory labour usually resolved 
the problem more quickly in the short 
term than did redirecting failures to their 
source, it may in fact be counterproductive 
in the longer term by rendering invisible 
at system level the operational failures 
themselves and the possible improvement 
opportunities associated with them. 
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laboratory results) could not be shared with 
practice clerical staff:
‘Time is often taken up with the interface for 
communication between us and secondary 
care. So letters that were meant to come but 
didn’t come, letters are not giving enough 
information, or not explicit. This morning 
I had a letter that was pretty ropey in all 
respects … if they’d just given me the dose 
it would have been straightforward .’ (GP2)
‘Information clutter is an absolutely 
overwhelmingly gargantuan issue.’ (GP6)
Operational failures also complicated GPs’ 
communication with hospitals, sometimes 
resulting in delays for patients. For instance, 
changes in care pathways and requirements 
for specific forms that themselves changed 
often made organising secondary care 
difficult and frustrating, with GPs’ referrals 
sometimes returned to the practice without 
any clinical action being taken:
‘We used to refer to the clinician that we 
thought was the correct clinician to see the 
patient, now we don’t have that option, they 
have to go through a central service, which 
causes a delay for the patient — the patient 
gets frustrated, we end up having to see 
the patient more often, that causes more 
inefficiency for the GP.’ (GP19)
GPs also reported problems associated 
with electronic referral systems to 
community and social care, which had 
replaced previous direct contact with 
colleagues. Electronic referrals left 
GPs uncertain when the patient would 
be seen, hindered their ability to offer 
multidisciplinary community-based care, 
and pushed them to refer patients to 
hospital that would otherwise have been 
cared for at home:
‘All of us can spend an hour sometimes 
trying to get somebody some care to keep 
them at home, and often there isn’t any, 
and we go round and round in circles. We 
spend an hour phoning up and then we get 
nowhere. So, I think we’ve all given up now. 
And then, of course, we send the people 
to hospital inappropriately […] but we feel 
guilty because it’s just not how we’re meant 
to practise.’ (GP18)
Communication with community 
pharmacies was also vulnerable to 
inadequate information transfer, for 
example, through the loss of electronic 
prescriptions in the journey between 
practice and pharmacy. This is an issue that 
was often left to GPs to resolve:
‘People say I ordered my prescription three 
days ago, for some reason they haven’t got 
the prescription between the prescription 
system or the pharmacist […] so you find the 
receptionist coming into the room to say we 
can’t find this prescription, it’s lost, can you 
duplicate, print and sign it.’ (GP11)
Processes within practices themselves 
were not immune to operational failures. 
GPs reported that their work was disrupted 
by failures relating to equipment, including 
broken electrocardiograph machines, 
missing thermometers, and unstocked 
materials such as urine containers. 
Technology problems, such as crashing 
or non-booting computers, interfered 
frequently with access to electronic health 
records and added pressure to already 
strained 10-minute consultations:
‘I was trying to do a prescription for a 
patient. The computer froze. I couldn’t get it 
to unfreeze. I stopped that consultation, had 
to re-boot the computer and then go back 
into all the different systems that I was in, 
get the prescription out and the patient had 
to wait ten minutes, it put me behind; that 
often happens.’ (GP1)
GPs also reported direct interruptions 
of their work by other practice staff. Some 
practices had introduced a system where 
all urgent queries were directed to the 
‘duty doctor’ (a GP rostered to triage phone 
calls and see emergency cases) with the 
intention of shielding remaining GPs from 
unpredictable interruptions and ensuring 
their clinical sessions ran smoothly. Not all 
practices used this approach, and where it 
was in place it was often stressful for the 
doctor involved:
‘This is why we’ve brought the duty doctor 
system, so that all those interruptions go 
to somebody who is not running a normal 
surgery […] I agree we need to get to the 
bottom of the problem, but we feel that 
a typical day should be as smooth as 
possible.’ (GP11)
‘On a duty doctor day you will be disturbed 
significantly in terms of calls, knocks on the 
door, facilitating the nursing staff if they’ve 
got any questions plus dealing with any 
queries from reception.’ (GP5)
GPs in rural practices reported 
spending more time travelling to home 
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visits, so failures relating to home visits 
disproportionately affected their work. 
Examples included being called out for 
duties that other services (for example, 
district nurses, community emergency 
response team) did not have the capacity 
to deliver, wasted journeys due to incorrect 
patient addresses, or being called to write 
up drug charts for care home patients that 
could have been written by hospital doctors:
'We had a patient who had just been 
discharged from hospital to a nursing home 
[…] they [the hospital staff] hadn’t written 
the drug chart. So this came in to be done 
urgently. And the system failure on our part 
was that the administrative staff who took 
the call to book the home visit did not put 
the new address […] so I went to their home 
and they were not there.’ (GP11)
Compensatory labour is required to 
address operational failures 
GPs reported that, as patients’ first point 
of contact with the health service and as 
the physician responsible for generalist 
longitudinal care, they were exposed to 
operational failures in all facets of the 
healthcare system. GPs felt that their 
secondary and community care colleagues 
had both ‘unrealistic expectations’ (GP20) 
of what general practice could deliver and 
an inaccurate view of GPs as the ‘default 
person to look after things’ (GP8). These 
expectations compounded the effects 
of operational failures in primary care, 
resulting in GPs doing work that they felt 
would be done more quickly or effectively 
by others, was the clear responsibility of 
others, or for which they lacked system-
level supports:
‘As a GP, I liaise with community 
rehabilitation or nursing or palliative care 
or other services and because these 
various services are quite fragmented and 
difficult to communicate with, certainly in 
the last year or two, that interferes or 
interrupts those kind of tasks. Coordinating 
complicated care often takes a lot longer 
than it used to.’ (GP14)
‘They make it very clear that they expect you 
to do it, and it’s really not appropriate — that 
can be annoying.’ (GP4)
GPs felt that, as the presumed coordinator 
of their patients’ care, there was an onus 
on them to work around the operational 
failures they encountered. As a result, they 
were forced into the role of compensating 
for operational failures, a role that had 
significant impacts on the character and 
volume of their work:
‘I’m in the boat where I’d rather do the best 
for my patient, so if it’s quicker for me to do 
it, I will just do it, I will take that extra work.’ 
(GP17)
‘If you’re busy and there’s resistance, you 
end up just caving in and getting on with it 
because it’ll be quicker that way.’ (GP1)
The bridging actions taken by GPs to 
close the gap between what patients 
needed and the operational failures that 
got in the way of meeting those needs 
were labelled as compensatory labour. 
Compensatory labour was required by the 
ubiquity of operational failures combined 
with GPs’ deeply felt responsibilities for 
synthesising information and coordinating 
care. The tasks of compensatory labour 
were characteristically mundane, but, in 
the context of highly pressurised schedules, 
they imposed significant burdens on 
GPs; the frequency of individually small 
compensations meant that cumulative 
time losses were highly impactful. Each 
extra step a GP had to take to deal with 
an operational failure added to the 
complexity of completing a task. Having to 
undertake often very significant amounts 
of compensatory labour actively configured 
the work that GPs were doing on a daily 
basis:
‘… you end up having to write a lot of 
letters to chase things up — the patient has 
already been to see you once, you then have 
to contact them again to explain the results. 
So, you end up doing three steps, where 
there could have been just one.’ (GP19) 
‘I’m currently waiting on a clinic letter from 
a consultant that’s been at least around 
a month […] I will phone the consultant 
directly and the liaison officer can also help 
… you make the best of it, you just have to 
get around the problems.’ (GP12)
Compensatory labour also required 
trade-offs. Addressing failures as they 
occurred might achieve short-term benefits 
for one patient, but shifted risk to other 
patients by virtue of time pressures or 
cognitive overload:
‘It’s extra time for us to look through the 
notes, to chase up on blood test results and 
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sort the problems out […] that limits the 
time for us doing other things.’ (GP15)
Repeatedly compensating for operational 
failures that were not of their own doing 
and were not related to their professional 
training added to GPs’ feelings of stress and 
low morale:
‘You feel quite stressed — I like things 
working efficiently instead of adding to your 
workload.’ (GP13)
Despite the burdensome nature of 
compensatory labour, GPs’ actions to 
remedy failures were generally invisible. 
Perhaps because compensating for the 
problems usually resolved them more 
quickly in the short term than redirecting 
them to the source, or perhaps because 
reporting operational failures was 
perceived as futile, only a small minority 
reported system-level operational failures 
to authorities such as GP liaison officers, 
commissioners, and others:
‘I know that I’ve got to write two letters today 
to the GP liaison officers — it just takes time 
[…] The frustrating thing with the hospital is 
you write to them in the hope that they can 
learn from it and improve it, but what they 
do is they just fob you off.’ (GP20)
A further reason not to formally report 
operational failures lay in the perception 
that the patient safety threats they 
posed were not as great as in secondary 
care, or that they could be more readily 
addressed by compensatory labour. In 
contrast, participants did describe regular 
meetings (for example, quarterly) to discuss 
significant safety events:
‘In a hospital environment, if the equipment 
is not working and someone is being 
brought in by ambulance with an acute 
coronary syndrome and that equipment 
… you can’t say come back on Monday 
because that patient might be dead. So in 
general practice it’s inconveniences and 
delays but very rarely harm.’ (GP14)
‘… a significant event — usually it’s big, 
some harm has to come to the patient. 
But I really think we haven’t really focused 
on these nitty-gritty [operational failure] 
issues.’ (GP11)
GPs were also often reluctant to 
attempt to change processes within their 
own practices, in part because they felt 
they lacked time or capacity to design, 
implement, quality assure, and oversee 
new processes. A prominent feature of 
interviews was that GPs reported simply 
trying to get through the pressures of their 
work each day rather than make proactive 
operational changes, describing their 
current situation as ‘running bloody fast on 
the treadmill’ (GP6). Operational systems 
in smaller practices appeared to benefit 
from greater continuity with patients, but 
these practices struggled in other ways, 
such as generating the slack internally to 
reorganise practice processes:
‘… if you can achieve better continuity of 
care with the patient, so you know the 
patient, and you know a bit more about 
them, that does streamline the system 
better.’ (GP19)
‘Each change needs space to breathe 
and the capacity to do it and actually 
there’s a question of safety, while you are 
experimenting with this, while you’ve got 
[administrative staff] attempting to start 
coding your records, you need to create 
GP capacity to cross-check the coding, and 
actually when we are all at breaking point it 
is quicker to do it myself.’ (GP9)
A second challenge to process redesign 
was that the obvious solution for many 
issues — delegating to other practice staff 
— was a source of anxiety for GPs. They felt 
that delegation could further complicate 
workflows, increase the risk of something 
being missed, or might not be acceptable 
from a medicolegal perspective:
‘When these failures arise, it’s just easier 
for me to do them, as opposed to try and 
find a way to delegate them.’ (GP10)
‘It’s interesting the level of responsibility 
that the GMC [General Medical Council] 
and the legal side of things put on GPs. 
There’s a general confusion in primary care 
about what can be delegated and what 
can’t and how you can delegate and create 
at our scale teams with enough resilience 
to actually be able to cope with pathways 
of work, making the rules clear that this is 
appropriate for somebody with no clinical 
expertise, this is your role, this is your set. 
So, we do vast quantities of administrative 
work that is soul-destroying.’ (GP9)
DISCUSSION
Summary
This study has identified the nature of 
operational failures that confront GPs, and 
suggests that these failures are profoundly 
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consequential for their experiences of work. 
Poorly designed and suboptimal work 
systems that GPs in this study described 
were indicative of a yawning gap between 
‘work-as-imagined’ (an idealised view 
of work tasks that disregards how task 
performance must be adjusted to match the 
constantly changing conditions in the work 
environment) and ‘work-as-done’ (what 
actually happens as work unfolds in time in 
complex contexts).13,21 GPs’ actions to plug 
this gap required substantial compensatory 
labour of an especially enervating kind: 
it made poor use of their knowledge and 
skills, and consumed scarce resources 
of time and energy.22 Many (though not 
all) sources of operational failures were 
located outside of practices themselves, but 
mechanisms for reporting external failures 
were used rarely, not least because GPs 
were likely to try to fix a problem in the 
here-and-now in order to ensure patients 
were not disadvantaged rather than seek 
to raise the problem at system level. For 
problems arising internal to practices, 
GPs were deterred by the scale of the 
effort required and uncertainties about 
some of the medicolegal issues, indicating 
that high-quality multi-modal support 
may be needed to improve processes at 
practice level. Ironically, GPs’ compensatory 
labour may in fact be counterproductive 
in the longer term by rendering invisible 
at system level the operational failures 
themselves and the possible opportunities 
for improvement.11,12,14,23
Comparison with existing literature
Recent studies on why GPs choose to leave 
clinical practice have identified reasons 
such as ‘surprise work’ (for example, 
the unpredictable extra demands on 
GPs’ time),24 diminished clarity around 
professional boundaries, poorly balanced 
work demands, and concerns about the 
scope, limits, and legal and professional 
liabilities associated with delegation.3,4,25,26 
This study’s findings build on these studies, 
showing how GPs are forced into an 
additional invisible (and unremunerated) 
workload of compensatory labour in the 
face of operational failures that is likely to 
contribute to stress, burnout, and possibly 
exits from clinical practice. 
Much of the previous research on 
operational failures has been conducted in 
secondary care environments. Studies on 
hospital-based operational failures11,12 have 
identified that they often concern defects 
in supply chains for equipment and other 
supplies. In contrast, this study found that 
primary care failures were more dominated 
by problems in communication of patient-
related information or mismatches in role 
expectations and responsibilities. It further 
found, as has previously been reported in 
the secondary care literature, that failures 
in primary care were met with resilience 
in the form of workarounds, and the term 
‘compensatory labour’ has been proposed 
to describe the work GPs do to fill the 
gap between what patients need and the 
operational failures that get in the way of 
addressing that need.
Strengths and limitations
A bottom-up qualitative approach was 
necessary to generate new understandings 
on system-level failures in primary care, 
which had previously been under-explored. 
A limitation is that the sample involved 
only one region of England, but the 
transferability of findings is supported by 
the diversity of settings including inner-
city and rural practices, large and small 
practices, and GP participants ranging 
from those recently qualified to those with 
significant practice experience. A strength 
of the study was its focus on examining 
work-as-done rather than the rarer (and 
potentially more discomfiting) topics of 
errors or critical incidents associated with 
operational failures. Although it is unlikely 
that the complete set of operational 
failures experienced by GPs was captured, 
eliciting the problems experienced in the 
most recent clinical session helped to 
ensure the data related credibly to routine 
care, and mitigated the risk of inaccurate 
recall. The multidisciplinary research 
team lent confirmability to the analysis 
by creating opportunities for reflexivity 
and demonstrating consistency during 
interviewing, coding, and analysis.
Implications for research and practice
By identifying the operational failures that 
routinely affect GPs working in the NHS, 
this study has illustrated how work-as-
done in general practice involves a largely 
invisible but highly consequential burden 
of compensatory labour. As others have 
also argued, in the context of an NHS 
Long Term Plan that gives primacy to the 
delivery of primary medical and community 
health services,27 commissioners 
and policymakers must resist the urge 
to place additional responsibilities on 
general practice until the gap between 
work-as-imagined and work-as-done is 
better understood.7 New initiatives such 
as Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships, Integrated Care Systems, 
and Primary Care Networks present 
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opportunities for GPs and colleagues 
in secondary and community care to 
work together on improving systems 
for communicating with each other, 
but these findings signal that changes 
should be designed for the world that is 
inhabited by GPs rather than an imagined 
or idealised world. Urgent clarification 
is also needed on some medicolegal 
aspects of change. Further, new changes 
in the division of responsibilities between 
primary and secondary care should not 
leave GPs straining to meet heightened 
policy expectations within an otherwise 
unchanged health system. Finally, efforts 
to address operational failures will benefit 
from learning from what goes right: the 
operational successes. The literature 
on positive deviance has shown that the 
ability to solve a problem may already 
exist within the community experiencing 
the problem, and the challenge is to find 
and share particular practices or solutions 
already in use that may be of benefit to 
all.28 Mechanisms to facilitate identification, 
harmonisation, and implementation are 
likely to be of particular value.29
Operational failures are common in 
general practice, and force stretched GPs to 
take additional steps to get patient-related 
work done. These compensatory actions may 
be hidden from the view of commissioners, 
policymakers, and other healthcare 
professionals, but are an important threat to 
GPs’ job satisfaction, patient safety, and the 
quality of care. Research is now required to 
quantify the impact of different operational 
failures in terms of time consumed, GPs’ 
efficiency, and patient care. Efforts to link 
specific operational failures with serious 
downstream errors will further determine 
which failures to prioritise for improvement 
in an evidence-based way.12,23
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